We introduce a bidding strategy which allows the seller to extract the full surplus of the high bidder in eBay auctions. We call this a "Discover-and-Stop" bidding strategy and estimate that 1.39% of all bids in eBay auctions are placed by sellers (or accomplices) who execute this strategy. We argue that this kind of shill bidding is unnecessarily e¤ective due to eBay's proxy system and the predictability of other bidders'bids. We show that eBay could slightly modify its auction mechanism to reduce the shilling we describe. We also model eBay auctions with shill bidding and …nd that, in equilibrium, eBay's pro…ts are higher with shilling than without it.
Introduction
eBay auctions is unnecessarily e¤ective due to eBay's proxy bidding system and the predictability of bidders' bids, (3) there are small changes eBay could make to its mechanism that would reduce shill bidding, and (4) eBay appears to have no incentive to make these changes since in equilibrium its pro…ts are higher with shill bidders. Our results highlight the importance of auction design as a method to reduce shill biddinga point also made by Ockenfels, Reiley, and Sadrieh (2006) .
Beyond the political and legal interest in shill bidding, our paper also contributes to the growing internet auction literature. Ockenfels, Reiley, and Sadrieh (2006) provide a good review of the this literature and include a review of the shill bidding literature. There are few papers which …nd empirical evidence of shill bidding perhaps because it is di¢ cult to detect (its possible illegality provides an incentive to shill bidders to hide their activity). The exception is Kau¤man and Wood (2003) who provide evidence of reserve price shilling in which sellers place abnormally large bids in order to avoid eBay's reserve price fees. Our paper is the second to …nd empirical evidence of shill bidding on eBay and the …rst to …nd it in the form of incremental bidding. To date, the literature's most common explanation for incremental bidding is that incremental bidders are naïve and confuse eBay's auction rules with those of an ascending English auction. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) suggest that some incremental bidders are shill bidders, but they provide no evidence that shill bidding actually occurs. Since the shill bidding strategy we detect is an incremental bidding strategy, we provide evidence that some incremental bidders are shill bidders. We estimate that 1.39% of all bids placed on eBay are due to the incremental bidding strategy we detect.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of eBay's auction mechanism and a particular shill strategy that takes advantage of the mechanism and the predictability of bidders'bids. Section 3 provides evidence that shilling occurs and provides an estimate for its prevalence. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium e¤ects of shilling on eBay's pro…ts. Section 5 discusses alternative auction mechanisms that eBay could employ to reduce shilling. Section 6 concludes.
EBay' s Auction Mechanism
EBay runs a second-price proxy auction with bid increments and time priority. 6 A bidder in this environment places a maximum bid which is not observed by other bidders, and eBay's proxy bidder bids on his behalf up to his maximum. In particular, as a response to any acceptable bid b placed by another bidder, the high bidder H's proxy bidder bids minfb H ; b + "(p)g on H's behalf, where b H is H's maximum bid and "( ) is the bid increment as a function of price, p.
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We illustrate the procedure and nuance of a typical eBay auction by way of example. At time 0, the auction begins with some starting price determined by the seller. In this example, the starting price is $1:50
and the bid increment is $0:50. At time 1, bidder A places a bid of $5:00. Since there is no other bid to beat, the price remains at $1:50. At time 2, bidder B (who must place a bid no less than the price plus 6 In the case of a tie, the bidder who submitted the high bid earliest wins the item. 7 By "acceptable" bid, we mean any bid greater than or equal to the current price plus the bid increment.
the bid increment, i.e., $2:00) places a bid of $3:00. EBay's proxy bidder for bidder A then places the bid minf$3 + $0:50; $5g = $3:50, so at time 2, A is the high bidder and the price is $3:50. 8 At time 3, bidder C places a bid of $4:75. EBay's proxy bidder for A then places the bid minf$4:75 + $0:50; $5g = $5, so at time 3, A is the high bidder and the price is $5:00. It is worth noting that bid histories, which consist of bidders'user names and the bid amounts of all manually entered bids (as opposed to bids entered by a proxy bidder) other than the high bid, are typically observable over the course of an auction (See Figure 1 ). 9 Hence, at time 3, observers realize that bidder A's maximum bid is $5, since b 3 + " > P 3 , where b 3 is the amount of the (publicly observed) bid placed at time 3, " is the bid increment, and P 3 is the price resulting from C's bid at time 3. At time 4, bidder D places a bid of $8:00, so D becomes the high bidder, and the price moves to $5:50. Table 1 illustrates the example.
[ INSERT TABLE 1] A classi…cation of bidders in this environment is useful and can be found within Table 2 . Table 2 also includes several variables we will use later in our regressions.
[ INSERT TABLE 2] Figure 1 provides an example of the actual bidder history page displayed by eBay.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1]
An Example of a Successful Shill
Because a seller's revenue is an increasing function of the second highest bid, sellers have an incentive to increase the second highest bid as much as possible without becoming the high bidder. By way of example, we now illustrate how shill bidders can take advantage of eBay's proxy bidding mechanism to increase their revenue.
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8 The $5:00 bid by A and the $3:00 bid by B are called "manual" bids since they are manually entered by the bidders. The bid of $3:50 is called a "proxy" bid since the bid was placed automatically on A's behalf. 9 Sellers can choose to run auctions in which the bid amounts are observed but the bidders'identities are hidden. EBay and sellers often argue that hiding bidders' identities reduces the solicitation of bidders by eBay members and outside observers, i.e., it prevents others from o¤ering to sell similar items to the losing bidders.
1 0 EBay's position on shill bidding is posted on their website: "Shill Bidding is bidding that arti…cially increases an item's price or apparent desirability, or bidding by individuals with a level of access to the seller's item information not available to the general Community. Shill Bidding is prohibited on eBay. Violations of this policy may result in a range of actions, including: Listing cancellation, Forfeit of eBay fees on cancelled listings, Limits on account privileges, Loss of PowerSeller status, Account suspension and Referral to Law Enforcement."
The environment is the same as in Table 1 : the starting price is $1:50, and the bid increment is $0:50.
Assume for the moment that bidders only bid on the dollar. 11 At time 1, bidder B places a bid of $4:00, and the price remains at $1:50. Suppose the seller, S, has a shill account and desires to increase the price as much as possible without becoming the high bidder. At time 2, S places a bid of $2:00, after which the price goes to $2:50. Since bidders are assumed to only bid on the dollar, S knows that B's bid is at least $3:00. At time 3, S bids $3:00 and the price moves to $3:50, so at time 4 S bids $4:00, and the price only moves to $4:00. S then realizes that $4:00 is B's maximum bid, so S cannot push the price higher without becoming the high bidder, and he stops bidding. We call this type of bidder a "Discover-And-Stop" bidder because he bids incrementally until he discovers the high bid, and then he stops bidding. Table 3 illustrates the example.
[ INSERT TABLE 3] 3 Existence of Shill Bidders
Our Data
We divide our data into two samples: a "primary sample" and a "follow-up sample." Our primary sample consists of data collected from 39,212 Event Ticket auctions that ended between September 8, 2004 , and
September 23, 2004. 12 From each auction in our primary sample we observe the starting time, ending time, starting price, and seller ID. Also, from each auction's bid history page we collect information about each losing bid -including the bid amount, 13 the time of bid, the bidder's ID, and bidder's rating -placed in the auction (see Figure 1 ).
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Our follow-up sample consists of data collected from the bidder history pages (see Figure 2 ) of each of the 89,917 bidders who bid in one of the 39,212 auctions in our primary sample. From the bidder history pages we are able to determine on which auctions the bidder bid, the seller of each of the auctions, and the winning bidder of each of the auctions. We exclude from our follow-up sample the bidders'behavior during the primary sample timeframe because we do not want the samples to have overlapping data. Figure 3 illustrates our sampling. 1 1 An identical argument can be used if we instead assume that the seller has a high subjective probability that bidders bid only on the dollar. Based on our data of bidders' bids (see Figures 6 and Table 9 ), this belief would be consistent with actual bidding behavior. 1 2 We chose the Event Ticket category for two reasons: (1) we wanted substantial dispersion in bid amounts so that we could measure the predictability of bids across a wide range of values and (2) we believed there to be a large degree of heterogeneity of private values within this category. 1 3 EBay hides the amount of the winning bidder's maximum bid; for each winning bid we observe the ID and rating of the bidder and the time of the bid. 1 4 Our sample of auctions does not include Buy-it-Now auctions, auctions in foreign currency, auctions which ended with no bids, or auctions where bidder identities were hidden.
There are two types of "Buy-it-Now" auctions: one allows bidders to either bid or choose to pay the "Buy-it-Now" price and thereby end the auction and win the item, and the other only allows bidders to buy the item at the "Buy-it-Now" price (i.e., there is no bidding). We exclude both from our data set.
[ INSERT FIGURE 2] [ INSERT FIGURE 3] 
Shilling Variables
From the follow-up sample we create "shilling variables"-variables that indicate suspicious behavior between a bidder B and a seller S. In the extreme case, we expect a shill bidder to be a bidder B who bids on a large number of S's auctions, who bids exclusively on S's auctions, and who never wins. Using this intuition we construct the following shilling variables de…ned on (B; S) pairs:
NumAuctionsFLWUP -the number of S's auctions B bid on in the follow-up sample.
FracBidFLWUP -the fraction of B's bids that were on S's auctions in the follow-up sample.
FracLoseFLWUP -the fraction of NumAuctionsFLWUP in which B lost. Table 4 provides summary statistics for these variables. Ultimately, we would like some function of these shilling variables-which we call a Shill Score-to measure the shilling characteristics between a bidder and a seller. Such a score would be most useful as a ranking tool for enforcers (eBay or the government) so that they can best identify which (Bidder, Seller) pairs are most suspicious and warrant further investigation.
Also, later in the paper we demonstrate the usefulness of a Shill Score as a predictive tool. In particular, the Shill Score of the second-highest bidder in an auction helps predict whether the high bidder will pay his entire bid, which is consistent with the idea that shill bidders aim to extract as much consumer surplus from the high bidder as possible.
Results
We formally de…ne a "Discover-And-Stop" (or "DiscNStop") bidder as a bidder who bids consecutively within a 10 minute interval, discovers the high bid, and chooses not to exceed the high bid. 15 We use a probit model to see whether the three shilling variables gathered from the follow-up sample help predict whether a bidder is a Discover-And-Stop bidder inside our primary sample. Our results are reported in Table 5 .
An observation in this setting corresponds to one (Bidder, Seller) pair in one auction. Hence, an auction with n > 1 unique bidders would generate n observations (we exclude all auctions with only one bidder since the Discover-and-Stop strategy requires more than one bidder). We use the follow-up sample data to predict behavior within the primary sample so that our predictions are out-of-sample. To further avoid contamination in our results we only consider (Bidder, Seller) pairs in which the bidder lost the auction in the primary sample in speci…cations (4) and (5) in Table 5 . 16 We …nd that bidders with lower user ratings are more likely to participate in the Discover-and-Stop bidding strategy which is consistent with the idea that these bidders are either shill bidders or inexperienced bidders. We also …nd that two of the three shilling variables, NumAuctionsFLWUP and FracBidFLWUP, [ INSERT TABLE 5] Since the event DiscNStop = 1 is a tail event, we run OLS as a robustness check. The results are in Table   6 and are qualitatively similar to those found in Table 5 . These results provide evidence that some shill bidders indeed use the Discover-And-Stop strategy to execute their shill.
[ INSERT TABLE 6] 1 5 By "discovers the high bid" we mean that the last bid in his bidding sequence, b 2 , is less than or equal to the high bid but strictly greater than the high bid minus the increment (i.e. b H b 2 > b H "). This allows him to infer the high bid without becoming the high bidder. By "chooses not to exceed the high bid" we mean that the next bid following his bidding sequence is not his bid. 1 6 We do this because a Discover-And-Stop strategy is, by de…nition, a losing strategy. We might expect a bidder who lost in a seller's auction to be more likely to bid again in another auction by that same seller (if he is selling a similar item). By restricting the observations in the regression to only losing (Bidder, Seller) pairs, we can be more con…dent our shilling variables are related to a shill bidder's behavior and not to a losing bidder's behavior.
From this probit we can recover a Linear Shill Score (LSSCORE) by using the coe¢ cients on the signi…cant shilling variables under speci…cation (4): LSSCORE = 0:0065223 N umAuctionsF LW U P + 0:2215 F racBidF LW U P With this shill score in mind, we make two observations: (1) a shill score is a coarse representation of a binary event (either a bidder is a shill bidder or he is not) so that the tails of the shill score's distribution are of particular signi…cance and (2) if shill bidding is successful, then when the second-highest bidder in an auction is suspicious (i.e. has a high shill score) it is more likely that the high bidder in the auction paid his entire valuation. Although we generally cannot observe the high bidder's bid in an auction, we can observe the auctions in which the high bidder paid the full amount of his bid. As illustrated in Section 2, we know a high bidder paid the full amount of his bid when the second highest bid plus the increment is greater than the highest bid. To get a sense of the economic signi…cance of our shilling variables with respect to the high bidder's bid, we sort our auctions in the primary sample based on the LSSCORE of the second highest bidder. In Table 6 we report the frequency in which the high bidder paid the full amount of his bid for di¤erent percentiles of LSSCORE. We …nd that when the second highest bidder has an LSSCORE above the 95th percentile (i.e. he is "suspicious"), the empirical probability of the high bidder paying his full valuation is 12.4%. When the second highest bidder is below the 95th percentile, the empirical probability of the high bidder paying his full valuation is 7.9%. The di¤erence is statistically signi…cant and surprisingly strong: in our sample a high bidder is 56% more likely to pay his entire bid when the second-highest bidder is suspicious (has a high LSSCORE with the seller) than when the second-highest bidder is unsuspicious (has a lower LSSCORE with the seller).
[ INSERT TABLE 7]
Even more evidence of shilling behavior via incremental bidding comes from the type of auction that sellers choose. As mentioned earlier, sellers have the option of making the bidders' identities public or private. We might think that private auctions are a shill bidder's paradise since the seller can create an alternate user account, bid on his own item and blend in perfectly with the crowd of other bidders. Thus-all other things equal-we expect to see more incremental bidding in these markets. However, deciding what is an incremental bid in a private market (with hidden identities) is di¢ cult. When we see two consecutive bids, how are we to know whether these bids were placed by the same bidder? We treat this issue by making 1 7 One objection to our results is the following: sellers who engage in shill bidding will be careful to avoid detection, and therefore the evidence we …nd must be a result of some other phenomenon. We believe some shill bidders try to hide their shilling, but we observed several (Bidder, Seller) pairs with high LSSCORES such that the bidder name was a simple permutation of the seller name.
For example, one (Bidder, Seller) pair with a high shill score was (ABC,CBA) where A and B represent 5-letter words and C represents a 4-letter word.
We disguise the actual (Bidder, Seller) identities for privacy reasons.
the following observation of bidding behavior in public markets. We count the number of times consecutive bids are placed within 30 seconds of each other before the last 5 hours of the auction (when bidding activity signi…cantly increases), and we name such consecutive bids INCR30 bids. In our original sample of 39,212 public auctions we observe this behavior 84,654 times. Out of the 84,654 instances of INCR30 bids in public bidder auctions, all but 8 of the consecutive bids were made by the same bidder. Simply put, in a public auction in which we observe consecutive bids placed within 30 seconds of each other before the last 5 hours of an auction, we are 99.99% sure those bids were placed by the same bidder. If we are nearly sure that such bids are placed by the same bidder, it is natural to ask how many INCR30 bids we observe in private auctions. Table 8 summarizes these results from a sample of 1,859 private auctions in the Event Ticket category between the same dates as our public sample.
[ INSERT TABLE 8] We can see from the …gure that while the average number of bids per auction is only slightly higher in the private case, the number of INCR30 bids per auction is signi…cantly higher. This suggests there is considerably more incremental bidding in private auctions, a conclusion that is consistent with the existence of shill bidders using an incremental bidding strategy to drive up the price in private auctions while remaining anonymous.
More Evidence of Shilling and an Estimate of its Prevalence
The previous results suggest competitive shill bidding occurs, but they do not give us any indication of how many bids are placed by shill bidders. We now present additional evidence that shilling occurs and in the process obtain an estimate for the amount of shilling that occurs.
First, consider the following de…nitions of (mutually exclusive) bidder types:
DiscNStop bidder -a 10 minute incremental bidder who bids until he discovers the current high bid, at which point he stops bidding to avoid becoming the high bidder.
DiscNGo bidder -a 10 minute incremental bidder who discovers the high bid and then bids again so that he becomes the high bidder.
NoDisc bidder -a 10 minute incremental bidder who stops bidding before he discovers or exceeds the current high bid.
Consider an incremental bidder i with valuation v i for an item in an auction with current price p and current high bid b. Let p T denote the closing price of the item. (The variables v i and p are known by the incremental bidder when he starts his incremental bidding, whereas b and p T are not. 18 ) De…ne the variables:
. V i and B i are relative measures of the distance between the current price and bidder i's valuation and the current price and the current high bid, respectively.
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Assuming non-shill incremental bidders do not stop bidding until they become the high bidder or the price exceeds their valuation, and that they do not bid above their valuation, for each DiscNGo bidder we observe B i and conclude that V i > B i , and for each NoDisc bidder we observe V i and conclude that B i > V i .
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If there were no shill bidders, for each DiscNStop bidder we would observe V i and B i and conclude that
However, based on our earlier regression results, it is reasonable to conclude that there are two types of DiscNStop bidders: non-shill bidders such that b = v i , and shill bidders. In addition to our assumption on non-shill incremental bidding behavior, we also assume that shill bidders bid incrementally until they discover the current high bid and stop before they surpass it. Given this assumption, the distribution of the [ INSERT FIGURE 5] 1 9 We divide the expressions v i p and b p by p T because a $20 di¤erence between the current high bid and the current price seems signi…cant in auctions for which the closing price is $25, while the $20 di¤erence is not as signi…cant in auctions for which the closing price is $5000.
2 0 Actually, we only obtain estimates for B i and V i due to eBay's bid increments. This estimate is within " p T units of the actual value, where " is the bid increment and p T is the closing price. 2 1 This assumes the variable p T is independent of whether the seller is a shill bidder. 2 2 We do not include DiscNGo bidders in this dataset (i.e., we do not use a 2-sided kernel estimation) because we are not con…dent that their bids are equal to their valuations. DiscNGo bidders often discover the high bid and beat it by the increment. This is consistent with the literature's claim that some incremental bidders confuse eBay's proxy system with an English auction . We partition each CMF into 400 bins (each of size .0025) so that we have 400 points on each CMF. We …nd an estimate for by minimizing the following objective function under square loss:
This yields an estimate for of:4877. Therefore, we estimate that 48:77% of DiscNStop bids are shill bids. Since 2:85% of all bids are DiscNStop bids, one back-of-the-envelope estimation for the number of shill bids generated by the Discover-and-Stop strategy is 0:4877 :0285 = 1:39%.
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In reality this is a conservative estimate for the prevalence of shilling; it only estimates the number of bids placed by sellers who employ our Discover-And-Stop shill strategy. Some shill bidders may bid incrementally but mistakenly surpass the high bid, and others might stop their incremental bidding before reaching the current high bid. Our results do not estimate the prevalence of these or other forms of shilling.
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Notice that this argument for the existence of shillers focuses on the distribution of bidding sequences among bidder types. In particular, unlike the previous argument, it does not analyze how often a particular bidder bids on a particular seller's auctions. Thus, our two arguments are independent of one another, and together they strongly suggest that shill bidding does occur in eBay auctions.
Predictability of Bids
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Recall that Discover-And-Stop bidding is an e¤ective shill technique when bidders bid in predictable unitsespecially when those bids are multiples of the bid increment. Figure 6 describes the distribution of bids less than $100, and Table 9 describes the frequency at which bidders bid on multiples of the increment at each price range. Figure 6 and Table 9 suggest that sellers are indeed able to execute the Discover-And-Stop shill strategy.
[ INSERT FIGURE 6] 2 3 Notice that we are not claiming that 1.39% of all bidders are DiscNStop shill bidders, but rather that 1.39% of all bids are placed by DiscNStop shill bidders. 2 4 Kau¤man and Wood (2005) …nd evidence of a di¤erent form of shill bidding. Since eBay charges sellers a fee for using a secret reserve price, sellers who wish to use a secret reserve might have an incentive to set a low minimum bid and use a shill account to place a bid of their desired reserve amount. (By doing this, a seller must only sell his good if someone outbids his shill bid, i.e., if someone's bid exceeds the seller's desired secret reserve price.) Kau¤man and Wood call this reserve price shilling and document it in their paper. Our paper is the …rst to …nd evidence of competitive shill bidding : shilling where the seller waits for bidders to bid and then tries to drive the price up to the highest bidder's bid without becoming the high bidder. 2 [ INSERT TABLE 9] It is remarkable that bidders choose to bid on the dollar even though the vast majority of other bidders bid on the dollar, too. If a bidder were considering bidding $26, it seems that a bid of $25.02 would yield a strictly higher expected payo¤ since with high probability no other bidder will bid between $25.01 and $25.99; essentially, the bidder would win the good with a bid of $26 only if he also would have won with a bid of $25.02, and in the event that the second highest bid were $25, the bidder would save $0.98.
The E¤ects of Shilling on eBay' s Pro…ts
Ebay's auction policy explicitly prohibits shill bidding and, according to the NY Attorney General's O¢ ce, eBay has been helpful in providing data to investigate shill bidding in its auctions. 26 However, eBay's incentive to reduce shill bidding in their auctions is unclear. Dr. Hampton Finer, the economist who worked for the NY Attorney General's O¢ ce on the aforementioned cases, sums it up this way: "Obviously, shill bidding tends to move the prices up and eBay gets a fee that's based on price, then one might imagine that they would tacitly encourage shill bidding. At the same time, you don't want to discourage people from coming in and thinking that it's fair."
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To estimate how shilling a¤ects eBay's pro…ts, we consider the equilibrium behavior of bidders in a second price quasi-sealed bid auction (to be described below) in which the seller is a shill bidder with probability p.
Suppose there are n bidders in the auction, and suppose the bidders'valuations are distributed independently and identically from the uniform distribution over the unit interval [0; 1]. Let v i denote i's valuation for the good. Suppose that the seller is a competitive shill bidder with probability p 2 [0; 1]; i.e., with probability p the seller will bid the price up to the highest bidder's bid. In this context, a shill bidder is "successful" in his shill attempt if and only if he does not become the high bidder. Let q 2 [0; 1] be the probability that a shill bidder is successful in his shill attempt. Note that if a shill bidder is not successful in his shill attempt, he becomes the high bidder and the price of the item becomes the amount of the highest non-shill bid. Finally, assume that the seller is able to respond to all bidders'bids, but that bidders are not able to respond to other bidders'bids.
Proposition 1 All players bidding v i , where = (n 1)(pq+1 p) npq+(1 p)(n 1) , is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Let ( ) be bidder i's expected payo¤ from bidding v i given that the other bidders are bidding 2 6 For eBay's policy on shill bidding see footnote 9.
Comments about eBay's cooperation in the shill bidding cases can be found at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/nov/nov8a_04.html and http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/internetauction/Auction_Transcript_public.pdf 2 7 See http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/internetauction/Auction_Transcript_public.pdf v j . Note that:
Thus,
and 0 ( ) = 0. Hence, bidding v i is a best response for bidder i.
Unlike second price auctions, bidding one's valuation in this environment is not a dominant strategy because the amount the seller bids depends on the maximum of the other bidders' bids. Because of this feature bidders bid below their valuations in equilibrium.
If p = q = 1, the auction is equivalent to a …rst price sealed bid auction, and = n 1 n ; in this case, the above equilibrium is equivalent to the symmetric equilibrium of …rst price sealed bid auctions.
If p = 0, the auction is equivalent to a second price sealed bid auction, and = 1, which is the unique equilibrium in this environment.
By the revenue equivalence theorem, if q = 1, the seller's expected revenue equals 
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Because the fee eBay collects from its sellers is a function of the …nal price, eBay does not bene…t from shill bidding if shilling is perfectly e¢ cient.
To address the q < 1 cases, notice that @ (n; p; q) @q
Clearly, for …xed p (shilling probability), the expected …nal price of the good is increasing in . For any …xed shilling probability p 2 (0; 1), the above inequality shows that eBay's pro…ts are higher with parameter values (p; q), q < 1, than with (p; 1). Earlier, we argued that the expected …nal price with q = 1 (perfectly e¢ cient shilling) is the same as the expected price with p = 0 (no shilling). Hence, this model suggests that eBay's pro…ts are higher in the presence of shill bidding if and only if the shilling is not perfectly e¢ cient (q < 1).
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Alternative Auction Mechanisms
One change eBay could make to reduce shilling concerns its bid increments. Recall that under eBay's current mechanism, the proxy bidder of a current high bidder H bids minfb H ; b + "g whenever another bidder places an acceptable bid b, where b H equals H's maximum bid and " is the bid increment.
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Recall that this spread between the new bidder's bid, b; and the resulting price, minfb H ; b + "g, is what allows shill bidders to drive the price of the item to b H without bearing much risk of becoming the high bidder. If eBay were to change its proxy bidding system to one in which the current high bidder's proxy bidder matches any bid b b H (so that the resulting price is b, rather than minfb H ; b + "g), the seller would have a more di¢ cult time moving the price to b H without becoming the high bidder. Hence, shilling would be less pro…table for sellers, so shilling would likely decrease.
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EBay could also o¤er early and late bidders the option of having their bids processed at the close of the auction. If this option were added, sellers would be unable to respond to most bidders'bids. As a result, sellers would have fewer opportunities (and less incentive) to shill, which would likely result in less shilling. 32 
Conclusion
We have provided evidence of shill bidding via a strategy we call Discover-And-Stop bidding. Our evidence came from three independent analyses: (1) a probit model which demonstrates that (Bidder, Seller) pairs with intimate relationships are more likely to participate in Discover-And-Stop bidding, (2) an observation that incremental bidding (a fundamental property of the Discover-And-Stop strategy) is more popular in auctions where bidders have hidden identities and (3) distributional analysis of bidding sequences of Discover-AndStop bidders. We also showed that shill bidders can implement a Discover-And-Stop bidding strategy due to eBay's auction design and the predictability of bidders'bids. Although we suggested changes to eBay's 3 0 By "acceptable" bid, we mean a bid that is greater than or equal to the current price plus the bid increment. 3 1 The seller could still shill e¤ectively by taking advantage of eBay's bid retraction option. In particular, eBay allows bidders to quickly retract a bid if they "mistakenly" add an extra zero to their bid; so by "mistakenly" placing a shill bid that is ten times larger than what he "intended" to bid, a seller could determine the current high bid, retract that shill bid, and use a di¤erent shill account to submit a bid equal to the current high bid. Hence, eBay might need to eliminate its bid retraction option, too, in order to prevent shilling. 3 2 This change would also likely improve social welfare. Sniping, or last second bidding, is a strategy that is commonly used by bidders. The problem is that not all snipe attempts are processed: Roth and Ockenfels (2002) surveyed late bidders and reported that "more than 80 percent of the bidders who sucessfully bid at least once in the last minute of an eBay auction replied that it happened at least once to them that they started to make a bid, but the auction was closed before the bid was received."
Esnipe.com, an automated sniper, stopped reporting the frequency at which their bids are successfully submitted, but in September 2000 they reported that 4.5% of their bids failed to be successfully transmitted.
Obviously, when bids are not processed, the good often does not go to the person with the highest valuation, resulting in a welfare loss.
One objection to this proposal is that it might reduce e¢ ciency in common value environments. However, in the current eBay environment we see little reason for bidders to update their valuations in response to an early bidder's assessment of the value of a good, since an informed, non-shill bidder would have an incentive to wait until the close of the auction to place his bid. We believe that bidders obtain a more accurate estimate by observing the completed auctions of similar goods (which can easily be done via eBay's completed auction search). Ockenfels and Roth (2005) support our argument by showing that experienced bidders are more likely than inexperienced bidders to snipe. Moreover, eBay already o¤ers sellers the option of keeping the identities of bidders hidden; in these auctions, bidders cannot even determine the experience, user names, or bidder ratings of the bidders in the auction, so it seems even less reasonable for one to update his valuation in response to others'bids in this environment. auction mechanism that would reduce the incidents of shill bidding, we also showed that in equilibrium eBay is strictly better o¤ with shill bidders in their auctions so that a change of mechanism is unlikely.
TABLE 1. An Example of eBay's Auction Mechanism
The figure describes a typical eBay auction. EBay uses the pricing mechanism min{b H , b+ε(p)} where b H is the high bid, b is the current bid, and ε(p) is the bid increment ($0.50 in this example). Sellers also set the starting price ($1.50 in this example). EBay's price is observed by auction participants while the current high bid is not; however, at time 3, observers can infer that A's maximum bid was $5 due to eBay's pricing mechanism and the fact that bid histories are publicly observable. The number of bidders in an auction.
BRating
The eBay user rating of the bidder. An eBay user rating is a system that allows previous auction participants to leave feedback about a bidder or seller. A user's rating is the sum of its positive ratings minus the sum of its negative ratings. Since most feedback is positive, the user rating is a proxy for the number of auctions in which the bidder has previously participated.
DiscNGo bidder A 10 minute incremental bidder who bids until he discovers the current high bid and chooses to exceed the high bid. By "discovers the high bid" we mean that one bid in his bidding sequence, b, is less than or equal to the high bid but strictly greater than the high bid minus the increment (i.e. b H ≥ b> b H -ε). This allows him to infer the high bid without becoming the high bidder. By "chooses to exceed the high bid" we mean that the next bid following b is his bid.
DiscNStop bidder A 10 minute incremental bidder who bids until he discovers the current high bid and chooses not to exceed the high bid. By "discovers the high bid" we mean that the last bid in his bidding sequence, b 2 , is less than or equal to the high bid but strictly greater than the high bid minus the increment (i.e. b H ≥ b 2 > b H -ε). This allows him to infer the high bid without becoming the high bidder. By "chooses not to exceed the high bid" we mean that the next bid following his bidding sequence is not his bid.
Follow-up Sample A sample we take after observing the bidders and sellers in our primary sample. In the follow-up sample, we take data from each bidder's bid history page (see Figure 2 ) in order to analyze the relationship in each (Bidder, Seller) pair we observe in the primary sample.
FracBidFLWUP Defined for each bidder seller pair (B,S) found in the primary sample, it is the fraction of B's bids that were on S's auctions in the follow-up sample.
FracLoseFLWUP
Defined for each bidder seller pair (B,S) found in the primary sample, it is the fraction of NumAuctionsFLWUP in which B lost.
Incremental Bidder A repeat bidder whose multiple bids are consecutive, within a short period of time (and often differ by twice the bid increment). When we refer to a 10 Minute Incremental bidder, we mean that the window in which the consecutive bids must fall is 10 minutes.
INCR30 bidder A 30 second incremental bidder whose bids are not in the last 5 hours of the auction.
NoDisc bidder A 10 minute incremental bidder who stops bidding before he discovers or exceeds the current high bid.
NumAuctionsFLWUP Defined for each bidder seller pair (B,S) found in the primary sample, it is the number of S's auctions B bid on in the follow-up sample.
Primary Sample Our sample of 39,212 Event Ticket auctions which ended that ended between September 8 and September 24, 2004. Here we take data (e.g. bidder IDs, seller ID, etc.) from the home page of each auction as well as the bid history (see Figure 1 ) page for each auction.
Repeat Bidder A bidder who bids two or more times in the same auction.
Shill Bidder A seller (or an accomplice) who uses an alternate user account to bid on his own items.
Sniping
Bidding in the closing seconds of an auction.
WBid
The price (i.e. winning bid) at which the auction ended.
TABLE 3. Example of Discover-and-Stop Bidding
The table describes a particular type of shill bidding called Discover-And-Stop bidding. In this example, the bid increment is $0.50 and the starting price is $1.50. Assuming bidders only bid on the dollar, a shill bidder S can raise the price to bidder A's maximum bid without becoming the high bidder by placing incremental bids and inferring A's bid via eBay's pricing mechanism. At times 2 and 3, bidder S continues bidding because the new price exceeds S's bid by the entire increment. At time 4, the price does not exceed S's bid, so S knows A's bid is $4. Below are summary statistics for our primary sample and our follow-up sample. Data from the follow-up sample relate to the 161,895 unique pairs of bidder B and seller S we find in the primary sample. NumAuctionsFLWUP is the number of S's auctions B bid on in the follow-up sample; FracBidFLWUP is the fraction of B's bids that were on S's auctions in the follow-up sample; and FracLoseFLWUP is the fraction of NumAuctionsFLWUP in which B lost. FracBidFLWUP is undefined when we observe no bids by B in any auctions in the follow-up sample.
FracLoseFLWUP is undefined when we observe no bids by B on S's auctions in the follow-up sample. Here we use a probit to model the binary event that a pair (Bidder, Seller) participates in a Discover-And-Stop strategy. For an auction run by seller S we create a (Bidder, Seller) pair for each bidder B who bid in S′s auction. We set the variable DiscNStop = 1 for a (B,S) pair when B is the bidder in at least one Discover-And-Stop bidding sequence. We include in the regression three shilling-related variables: NumAuctionsFLWUP (the number of S's auctions B bid on in the follow-up sample), FracLoseFLWUP (the fraction of NumAuctionsFLWUP in which B lost) and FracBidFLWUP (the fraction of B's bids that were on S's auctions in the follow-up sample). BidderCount is the number of bidders in the auction, WBid is the size of the winning bid in the auction and BRating is B's eBay rating in the auction. We lose observations from specification (2) to (3) because FracBidFLWUP is only defined for (B,S) pairs in which B has observations in the follow-up sample. We lose observations from specification (3) to (4) because we only consider losing (B,S) pairs from the primary sample. We lose observations from specification (4) to (5) because FracLoseFLWUP is only defined for (B,S) pairs in which we observe B bidding on at least one of S's auctions in the follow-up sample. From all specifications we exclude auctions with only one bidder (a Discover-and-Stop strategy requires more than one bidder). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
( Here we run OLS regressions to model the binary event that a pair (Bidder, Seller) participates in a Discover-And-Stop strategy. For an auction run by seller S we create a (Bidder, Seller) pair for each bidder B who bid in S′s auction. We set the variable DiscNStop = 1 for a (B,S) pair when B is the bidder in at least one Discover-And-Stop bidding sequence. We include in the regression three shilling-related variables: NumAuctionsFLWUP (the number of S's auctions B bid on in the follow-up sample), FracLoseFLWUP (the fraction of NumAuctionsFLWUP in which B lost) and FracBidFLWUP (the fraction of B's bids that were on S's auctions in the follow-up sample). BidderCount is the number of bidders in the auction, WBid is the size of the winning bid in the auction and BRating is B's eBay rating in the auction. We lose observations from specification (2) to (3) because FracBidFLWUP is only defined for (B,S) pairs in which B has observations in the follow-up sample. We lose observations from specification (3) to (4) because we only consider losing (B,S) pairs from the primary sample. We lose observations from specification (4) to (5) because FracLoseFLWUP is only defined for (B,S) pairs in which we observe B bidding on at least one of S's auctions in the follow-up sample. From all specifications we exclude auctions with only one bidder (a Discover-and-Stop strategy requires more than one bidder). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) The table describes the frequency in which the high bidder pays his entire bid for various percentiles of the LSSCORE between seller S and the second highest B 2 . LSSCORE = 0.0065223*NumAuctionsFLWUP + 0.2215*FracBidFLWUP and is taken from specification (4) in Table 5 . The number of auctions listed here is less than our full sample because we only include observations for which the LSSCORE is defined for (B 2 , S). The column labeled "High Bidder Paid Max" refers to the percentage of auctions in which we observe the high bidder paying his entire bid; we can infer that the high bidder has paid his maximum when the second highest bid plus the increment is greater than the highest bid. 
FIGURE 2. Example of an eBay Bidder's History Page
The figure is an example of eBay's bidder history page for a particular bidder (not in our sample). The page records the auctions that the bidder has bid on in the past 30 days, the seller of each auction, and the auction's high bidder.
Current auctions bid on by rachel7399 ( 63 )
For auction items, bold price means at least one bid has been received. 
FIGURE 3. Primary Sample and Follow-up Sample
In our primary sample of 39,212 Event Ticket auctions we collect auction data -starting time, ending time, starting price and seller ID --from each auction. From the bid history pages of each auction we also collect bidding data --each bid amount, time of bid, and bidder ID. From the bid history pages of our primary sample of auctions we find 89,917 unique bidders and 161,895 unique pairs of (Bidder, Seller). Using the 89,917 unique bidder IDs we perform a follow-up sample to examine each bidder's behavior outside the primary sample window. Using eBay's bidder history function for each bidder we observe how many auctions each bidder bid on, the seller in each auction and the high bidder in each auction. The follow-up sample region is completely outside the primary sample region to avoid contamination in our regression results. Also, the window of time in the follow-up sample preceding the primary sample is small because eBay's bidder history function only allows users to observe completed auctions within the last 30 days (it took 6 days to gather and compile our primary data). The window of time in the follow-up sample proceeding the primary sample is large since we could use the bidder history tool multiple times after our primary sample was gathered. The graphs illustrate the empirical distributions of normalized measures of the distance between the current price and the current high bid [i.e. B i = (current high bid --current price)/(closing price)] among incremental bidding sequences. We estimate these distributions using our sample of 39,212 Event Ticket auctions and restrict attention to bidding sequences (1) in the last day of the auction and (2) where the high bid and the current price differ by at least 3 bid increments. We make these restrictions because (1) the majority of Discover-And-Stop bidding occurs on the last day of an auction (and we suspect shill bidders are most likely to bid when higher bids have been placed later in the auction) and (2) the current high bid and the current price must differ by at least 3 bid increments for a Discover-And-Stop incremental bidder to execute his strategy (see Figure 3) . The first graph is the empirical distribution of B i among all non-Discover-And-Stop incremental bidding sequences (before the winning bid is placed) --a measure of the distance a bidder must travel in order to reach the high bid. The second graph is our estimate of the distribution of B i given B i = V i --a measure of how far a bidder traveled given his valuation is identical to that of the high bidder. We estimate the histograms using 1-sided, uniform kernel estimation with a bandwidth of .02. The third graph illustrates the distribution of B i among Discover-And-Stop bidders --a measure of how far a bidder traveled given he is a Discover-And-Stop bidder. Given our assumptions on bidder behavior, the last distribution is a mixture of the first two. 
